Početna strana > Rubrike > Wikileaks na NSPM > Izveštaj sa prvog susreta ambasadorke Vorlik sa predsednikovim savetnikom Ratkovićem
Wikileaks na NSPM

Izveštaj sa prvog susreta ambasadorke Vorlik sa predsednikovim savetnikom Ratkovićem

PDF Štampa El. pošta
Vikiliks   
petak, 17. decembar 2010.

Viewing cable 10BELGRADE25, SERBIA: AMBASSADOR’S FIRST MEETING WITH PRESIDENTIAL FOREIGN

Prvi susret ambasadora sa predsednikovim savetnikom za inostranu (politiku Ratkovićem)

If you are new to these pages, please read an introduction on the structure of a cable as well as how to discuss them with others. See also the FAQs

Understanding cables 
Every cable message consists of three parts:

The top box shows each cables unique reference number, when and by whom it originally was sent, and what its initial classification was.

The middle box contains the header information that is associated with the cable. It includes information about the receiver(s) as well as a general subject.

The bottom box presents the body of the cable. The opening can contain a more specific subject, references to other cables (browse by origin to find them) or additional comment. This is followed by the main contents of the cable: a summary, a collection of specific topics and a comment section.

To understand the justification used for the classification of each cable, please use this WikiSourcearticle as reference.

Discussing cables 
If you find meaningful or important information in a cable, please link directly to its unique reference number. Linking to a specific paragraph in the body of a cable is also possible by copying the appropriate link (to be found at theparagraph symbol). Please mark messages for social networking services like Twitter with the hash tags #cablegate and a hash containing the reference ID e.g. #10BELGRADE25.

Reference ID

Created

Released

Classification

Origin

10BELGRADE25

2010-02-05 14:02

2010-12-09 21:09

SECRET

Embassy Belgrade

VZCZCXRO7590

RR RUEHAG RUEHDBU RUEHFL RUEHKW RUEHLA RUEHNP RUEHROV RUEHSL

DE RUEHBW #0025/01 0361420 begin_of_the_skype_highlighting              
0025/01 0361420      end_of_the_skype_highlighting

ZNY SSSSS ZZH

R 051420Z FEB 10

FM AMEMBASSY BELGRADE

TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 0713

INFO EUROPEAN POLITICAL COLLECTIVE

RHEHAAA/NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL WASHINGTON DC

RHMFISS/HQ USEUCOM VAIHINGEN GE

RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHINGTON DC

RUZEJAA/JAC MOLESWORTH RAF MOLESWORTH UK

Friday, 05 February 2010, 14:20

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 05 BELGRADE 000025

SIPDIS

AMEMBASSY ANKARA PASS TO AMCONSUL ADANA

AMEMBASSY ASTANA PASS TO AMCONSUL ALMATY

AMEMBASSY BERLIN PASS TO AMCONSUL DUSSELDORF

AMEMBASSY BERLIN PASS TO AMCONSUL LEIPZIG

AMEMBASSY BELGRADE PASS TO AMEMBASSY PODGORICA

AMEMBASSY HELSINKI PASS TO AMCONSUL ST PETERSBURG

AMEMBASSY ATHENS PASS TO AMCONSUL THESSALONIKI

AMEMBASSY MOSCOW PASS TO AMCONSUL VLADIVOSTOK

AMEMBASSY MOSCOW PASS TO AMCONSUL YEKATERINBURG

EO 12958 DECL: 2020/02/05

TAGS PREL, PGOV, MARR, SR, KV

SUBJECT: SERBIA: AMBASSADOR’S FIRST MEETING WITH PRESIDENTIAL FOREIGN

POLICY ADVISOR RATKOVIC

REF: BELGRADE 19; STATE 9661

CLASSIFIED BY: Deborah Mennuti, Political Counselor, State, POL; REASON: 1.4(B), (D)

 Sažetak

-------

 1. (C) U razgovoru sa ambasadorom od 3. Februara predsednikov savetnik za spoljnu politiku Jovan Ratković je preneo želju Srbije da intenzivira saradnju sa SAD i detaljno prikazao svoje planove posete Vašingtonu od 10-12 februara (gde bi putovao, prim. prev.) da razgovara o mogućim načinima da se ostvari napredak (u pogledu, prim. prev.) Kosova, rekavši da Srbija za Srbe i Albance traži „realistično, pragmatično, mirno rešenje u kome su obe strane pobednici“.

On je iskazao zabrinutost da bi plan Međunarodne civilne kancelarije (ICO) da integriše severno Kosovo mogao da destabilizuje situaciju i ugrozi političku stabilnost u Srbiji i nije želeo da prihvati razgovor o pitanju da li će Srbija tražiti novu rezoluciju Generalne skupštine UN (UNGA) koja bi pozvala na nove pregovore o statusu. Ratković je pomenuo važnu ulogu koju KFOR ima na Kosovu i rekao da će Srbija formalno otvoriti misiju pri NATO do sredine 2010 godine, te da će povećati učešće u aktivnostima Partnerstva za mir (Partnership for Peace). Napredak ka članstvu u Evropskoj uniji (EU) će, veoma verovatno, biti usporen zbog evropske zamorenosti proširivanjem i opreza da novi članovi ne budu primljeni sve dok ne budu u potpunosti kvalifikovani (za to, prim. prev.), prognozirao je. Ratković je izrazio oprezan optimizam (u pogledu toga, prim. prev.) da bi proboj u bilateralnim odnosima sa Hrvatskom bio moguć, brigu nad dugoročnom stabilnošću Makedonije te razočarenje lošim stanjem odnosa sa Crnom Gorom. Kraj sažetka.

2. (SBU) Ambasador je 3. Februara pozvao predsedničkog savetnika za spoljnu politiku Jovanu Ratkoviću pozvao da se upoznaju (u originalu: introductory courtesy call). Ratković je bio u pratnji svog zamenika Aleksandra Kneževića.

 Bilateralni odnosi

------------------

3. (SBU) Ambasador se zahvalio Ratkoviću za pomoć (koju joj je pružio, prim. prev.) u organizovanju predaje akreditacija predsedniku Tadiću veoma brzo po (njenom, prim. prev.) dolasku (Ref B), čime joj je bilo omogućeno da veoma brzo počne da se susreće sa srpskim zvaničnicima. Ona je rekla Ratkoviću da će raditi na poticanju već postojećeg snažnog uzleta bilateralnih odnosa kroz proširenje saradnje u ekonomskim i bezbednosnim pitanjima uz konstruktivan rad na teškim pitanjima. Posete člana delegacije Kongresa (Codel) Vojnovića i člana delegacije Kongresa Pomeroja te pomoćnika sekretara za Evropu Stejt departmenta (EUR DAS) DŽounsa u februaru bile bi važne mogućnosti za razgovore, primetila je. Ratković je rekao da je senator Vojnović stari prijatelj koji je uvek dobrodošao u Srbiji. Ipak, problematična je činjenica da će on i senator Šahin stići 17. Februara nakon posete Prištini na godišnjicu proglašenja nezavisnosti; Ratković nije bio u mogućnosti da potvrdi da će predsednik Tadić da primi kongresnu delegaciju, što ovisi o odluci u pogledu obzira na raspored tog putovanja (u originalu: pending resolution of these itinerary concerns).

4. (S) Ratković je izrazio nadu da će 2010 biti „odlučujuća“ godina za izgradnju bilateralnih odnosa u kojima će Sjedinjene države tretitrati kao iskrenog partnera na svim područjima saradnje, a ne samo bezbednosti. Srbija ima nameru da nastavi saradnju sa SAD u osetljivim obaveštajnim pitanjima te da poveća saradnju u oblasti odbrane radeći na obuci za mirovne misije sa Nacionalnom gardom Ohaja. Multilateralno, Srbija se obavezala da pošalje dodatnih 50 žandarma (u misiju UN, prim. prev.) UNMISTAH na Haiti pod okriljem Evropske unije, te je u pregovorima sa Španijom oko slanja (u originalu: contributing) trupa za (u misiju UN, prim. prev.) UNIFIL u Libanu.

Razmena mišljenja o Kosovu

------------------------

5. (C) Ratković je obavestio ambasadora da će posetiti Vašington od 10. do 12. februara, nakon što poseti Wehrkunde u Minhenu i prijem (u originalu: event) Konzervativne partije u Londonu. Nada se da će da se sretne sa zamenikom sekretara Stejt departmenta (A/S) Gordonom, kao i sa kontaltima u Kongresu, radi „diskretne razmene mišljenja“ o putevima napretka u pogledu Kosova (u originalu: on ways forward on Kosovo). Ambasador je preneo zabrinutost SAD (Ref B) zbog indikacija da će Srbija da nastavi da zauzima suprotstavljeni pristup u pogledu Kosova nakon što Međunarodni sud pravde donese savetodavno mišljenje. Odbacujući pitanje da li će Srbija da traži rezoluciju Generalne skupštine UN kojom bi se pozvalo na nove statusne predloge kao „obično taktičko pitanje“ o kome će odlučivati Ministarstvo inostranih poslova, Ratković je rekao da je Predsedništvo zaokupljeno širim pitanjem o tome kako da se postigne „realistično, pragmatično, mirno rešenje u kome su obe strane pobednici“ za Srbe i Albance. Ratković je rekao da je Srbija priznala i da pokušava da poštuje „legitimne interese“ kosovskih Albanaca; zauzvrat, Srbija od Kosovara očekuje da poštuju legitimne interese kako Srbije tako i Srba na Kosovu. Naglasio je da vlasti Srbije žele da SAD budu deo (i da, prim. prev.) podrže rešenje koje će voditi regionalnoj stabilnosti i pomirenju. S tog razloga se on nada diskusijama u Vašingtonu koje će biti na visokom nivou, slobodno vođene i neformalne (u originalu: high-level, free-thinking, and informal discussions in Washington); dobio je jasne instrukcije od predsednika Tadića o detaljima te poruke, ali još uvek nije bio slobodan da ih (sa nama, prim. prev.) podeli.

6. (C) Ratković se na temu Kosova vratio kasnije tokom razgovora naglašavajući osetljivost načina na koji se postupa sa severom. Ratković smatra da severni deo Kosova ima istoriju drugačiju od južnog dela pokrajine, tvrdeći da su tri oblasti severno od Ibra bile pripojene pokrajini tek nakon Srugog svetskog rata da bi se napravio kontrabalans brzo rastućoj populaciji etničkih Albanaca. „Ti ljudi nikada nisu živeli sa Albancima, nikada se nisu osećali delom Kosova i neće prihvatiti vlast Prištine,“ rekao je. „Beograd ne pokušava da promeni realnost na terenu za kosovske Albance, ali menjanje realnosti kosovskih Srba bi takođe bilo destabilišiće“, dodao je. Zbog toga predlog Međunarodne civilne kancelarije (ICO) da se integriše sever kojeg je izneo Piter Fejt i kojeg su podržale SAD nije „bio od pomoći“, prema Ratkoviću, koji je tvrdio da se razgovaralo o vojnoj intervenciji. Rekao je da je to osnovni razlog zbog kojeg je Tadić odlučio da se 22. januara obrati Savetu bezbednosti UN: provođenje takve strategije moglo bi da za rezultat ima nestabilnost i time postane predmet brige za nacionalnu bezbednost Srbije, ugrožavajući demokratizaciju i prozapadnu orijentaciju zemlje. (Komentar: Istorijskoj argumentaciji Srbije se rutinski suprotstavljaju albanski istorijski pregledi. Ratkovićeva tvrdnja o zasebnoj istorijskoj „realnosti“ za Severnu Mitrovicu će, stoga, izazvati otpor kosovsko albanskih istoričara. Kraj komentara.) 

7. (C) Ambasador je odgovorio da ideje koje je izneo Fejt nisu nove; integracija severnog Kosova je oduvek bila na stolu. Ona je naglasila da nije bilo diskusija o upotrebi sile da bi se nametnula integracija čitave teritorije Kosova. Primetivši da mi razumemo osetljivosti vlasti Srbije ambasador je podvukao potrebu za otvorenom razmenom mišljenja o punom opsegu pitanja koja nisu rešena ohrabrivši Ratkovića da svoje mišljenje (sa sagovornicima, prim. prev.) detaljno podeli za boravka u Vašingtonu. Ratković je rekao da je Srbija dobila uveravanja Eropske unije da dokument kojeg je načinila Međunarodna civilna kancelarija nije plan Evropske unije. Dodao je da je, s obzirom na situaciju na terenu i odnos kosovskih Srba prema Međunarodnoj civilnoj kancelariji, upotreba sile jedini način da se plan provede.

Odnosi sa NATO

--------------

8. (SBU) Upitan o predsednikovim pogledima na odnose Srbije sa NATO, Ratković je rekao da kao raniji ministar odbrane predsednik Tadić dobro poznaje predmet. Tadić veruje da Srbija ne može zauvek da ostane izvan NATO, ali to ne govori često zbog političke osetljivosti tog pitanja. Ratković je objasnio da su nakon pada Berlinskog zida građani Jugoslavije pretpostavljali da će oni biti među prvima koji će ući u Evropsku uniju i NATO. Anti-NATO osećanja razvila su se od ratova iz vremena Miloševića i intervencije NATO 1999 godine. Ratković je karakterisao sadašnju javnu podršku Partnerstvu za mir i članstvu u NATO kao „začuđujuće visoku“ s obzirom na istoriju Srbije. 

9. (C) Srbija preduzima konkretne korake da poveća povezanost sa NATO, rekao je Ratković. Imenovala je ambasadora u NATO i uspostavila misiju; kada kancelarija bude u potpunosti operativna predsednik Tadić će putovati u Brisel, u junu ili julu, da je formalno otvori i nada se da će se obratiti Severnoatlanskom savetu. Tadić je dao instrukcije Ministarstvu inostranih poslova i Ministarstvu odbrane da povećaju učešće Srbije u Partnerstvu za mir „prema austrijskom modelu“. Ti koraci treba da prethode bilo kakvoj odluci o članstvu, rekao je Ratković. Dodao je da će se predsednik Tadić susresti sa komandantom SACEUR/EUCOM admiralom DŽejmsom Stavridisom 11. februara u Beogradu. Ratković je naglasio da predstava (u originalu: image) o NATO u srpskoj javnosti ima značajan uticaj na razvoj odnosa, pomenuvši ulogu KFOR u zaštiti kosovskih Srba i religijskih mesta te zabrinutosti zbog smanjenja tih snaga.

Evropska integracija

--------------------- 

10. (C) Ratković predviđa da će špansko predsedavanje EU gurati ka prihvatanju aplikacije za članstvo u EU u martu, ali ne zna da li će napor biti uspešan, imajući u vidu zasićenost država-članica proširivanjem i opreza da prihvate nove članove koji nisu u potpunosti kvalifikovani. Snažno negoduje zato što je pogrešno uverenje Nemačke da je proširenje bilo ekonomski štetno pre nego korisno (Nemačku, prim. prev.) navelo da uvede nove zapreke za kandidate, uključujući i što je upućivanje aplikacije za članstvo Komisiji političkim pre nego tehničkim pitanjem. On čvrsto veruje da i Srbija i Hrvatska imaju administrativni kapacitet i političku volju da ispune sve kriterijume EU, napominjući da će dolazeća deseta godišnjica svrgavanja Miloševića 5. oktobra pružiti priliku da se svet podseti na rezultate srpske „demokratske revolucije.“

Regionalni odnosi

------------------

11. (C) Ambasador je rekao Ratkoviću da SAD podržavaju napore Srbije da popravi odnose sa Hrvatskom i obavestio ga je da će PRM DAS Dejvid Robinson posetiti Beograd pošetkom marta da bi pogledao na koji način bi SAD mogle da doprinesu rešenju produžene izbegličke krize, posebno između Hrvatske i Srbije. Ratković je rekao da predsedništvo diskretno radi s Hrvatskom o „mapi puta“ za rešenje svih prvorazrednih bilateralnih pitanja, kao i to da su razumeli da je EZ poslala Zagrebu poruku koja je od pomoći, da Hrvatska treba da nađe solucije da bi zatvorila 23. poglavlje upitnika. Rekao je da je umereno optimističan (u pogledu toga, prim. prev.) da će u 2010. biti proboja sa Hrvatskom.

12. (C) Ratković je izrazio, u svetlu dolazećih izbora, pesimizam o izgledima da dođe do ustavne reforme u Bosni i Hercegovini. Rekao je da će špansko predsedavanje EU učiniti poslednji pokušaj da dosegne rešenje pre nego što izborna kampanja stvarno počne, ali da će da se suoči sa velikim otporima. Ratković je ponovio da vlasti Srbije podržavaju teritorijalni integritet BiH te da neće biti zavedene onim što on tvrdi da je želja većine stanovnika Republike Srpske, da se odvoje i pripoje Srbiji. U tom kontekstu, Srbija takođe podržava ulazak BiH u EU i NATO kao način da se država stabilizuje i zacementiraju trenutne granice. Ratković je rekao da je vlada SAD načinila pogrešnu računicu kada je ustavnu reformu načinila preduslovom za Akcioni plan pristupanja NATO Bosne i Hercegovine, s obzirom da većina bosanskih Srba nije za NATO. Izrazio je žaljenje što Butmirski proces nije doveo do saglasnosti s obzirom da su mnogi elementi plana bili prihvatljivi za sva tri konstitutivna naroda; prema njegovoj proceni bilo bi bolje izbeći „sve ili ništa“ pristup reformama i dati unapred status Akcionog plana za pridruživanje(u originalu: MAP status). 

13. (C) Srbija je više zabrinuta za budućnost Makedonije nego za budućnost Bosne, rekao je Ratković. Nije jasno kako država sačinjena od dve kompletno različite etničke grupe koje nemaju zajednički jezik ili veru mogu da se održe u zajednici, komentarisao je, posebno sa etničkom albanskom polupacijom koja raste takvom stopom da će se za 20 godina izjednačiti sa slovenskom. Ratković je rekao da je predsednik Tadić razgovarao sa obema stranama, grčkom i Makedonijom, o problemu naziva (Makedonije, prim. prev.) u nadi da će da odblokira put Makedonije i ka EU i NATO.

14. (C) Odnosi Srbije sa Crnom Gorom su na najnižem nivou u istoriji, rekao je Ratković, napomenuvši da su i on i Tadić crnogorskog porekla te situaciju posebno osećaju. Objasio je da je crnogorska vlada morala da se distancira od Beograda da bi pobedila na referendumu za nezavisnost, ali kako više nema spornih pitanja lopta je na na crnogorskoj strani terena. Ratković je prokomentarisao da ostaje da se vidi da li će se Crna Gora prema Srbiji odnositi kao prema „strateškom partneru ili strašilu“. U tome će važan kriterijum biti način na koji se Crna Gora odnosi prema organizovanom kriminalu, kojeg je Ratković identifikovao kao značajan problem za kojeg Srbija veruje da mora da ga rešava.

Komentar

-------

15. (C ) Budući da je Tadićev savetnik za spoljnu politku, Ratkovićevi komentari su najbliže tome da odražavaju predsednikove poglede na i viziju o svim temama. Njegova odluka da sledeće nedelje poseti Vašington, pod jasnim intrukcijama, da bi u diskreciji (u originalu: in a low-key manner) prikazao Tadićevo mišljenje o napretku (u originalu: way forward) nakon odluke Međunarodnog suda pravde je konstruktivan korak koji bi mogao da pruži važnu priliku da se utiče na strategiju Beograda. Prilikom susreta sa ambasdorom Ujedinjenog Kraljevstva početkom ove nedelje Ratković je skicirao sledeće ideje, koje verovatno odražavaju trenutno razmišljanje: Opcija A: neko razumevanje veće uloge Srbije na severu i nad pet manastira na jugu, u kojem slučaju bi Beograd „prihvatio“ ali ne i priznao Kosovo; Opcija B: Podela; Opcija C: Srbija bira između Kosova i EU. Opcija A (t.j. nalaženje načina da se definiše specijalan interes Srbije na severu i sa statusom nekih crkava na jugu) najverovatnije odražava ideje za čiju je razradu Beograd najviše zainteresovan. Dok će nedostatak odlučnosti Srbije da prizna Kosovo ostati prepreka (u pridruživanju) EU u dugom roku, Ratkovićeva uvertira sledeće nedelje mogla bi da pruži inicijelni prvi korak ka definisanju realističnijeg modus vivendi, na razmatranje na kojeg smo Srbe ohrabrivali.

16. (C) Ratković shvata da će ideje koje bude skicirao sledeće nedelje obezbediti samo osnovu za diskusiju, sa očekivanjem, podrazumeva se, mnogo većeg rada koji će da usledi. Bez obzira na sve rečeno mi smo ohrabreni onim što se pojavljuje kao rastuće prepoznavanje i strateške i taktičke važnosti što skorijeg otvaranja kanala za dijalog nakon odluke Međunarodnog suda pravde i potrebe da se sledećim koracima upravlja tako da oni ne ugroze ostale ključne ciljeve Beograda, iznad svega eventualni prijem u EU. Poseta ministra inostranih poslova Jeremića Vašintonu 22. februara i putovanje pomoćnika zamenika sekretara DŽounsa u region iste nedelje će da omoguće važne mogućnosti za kontinuiran rad u budućnosti. Kraj komentara. Vorlik (WARLICK)

 Viewing cable 10BELGRADE25, SERBIA: AMBASSADOR’S FIRST MEETING WITH PRESIDENTIAL FOREIGN

If you are new to these pages, please read an introduction on the structure of a cable as well as how to discuss them with others. See also the FAQs

Understanding cables
Every cable message consists of three parts:

The top box shows each cables unique reference number, when and by whom it originally was sent, and what its initial classification was.

The middle box contains the header information that is associated with the cable. It includes information about the receiver(s) as well as a general subject.

The bottom box presents the body of the cable. The opening can contain a more specific subject, references to other cables (browse by origin to find them) or additional comment. This is followed by the main contents of the cable: a summary, a collection of specific topics and a comment section.

To understand the justification used for the classification of each cable, please use this WikiSource article as reference.

Discussing cables
If you find meaningful or important information in a cable, please link directly to its unique reference number. Linking to a specific paragraph in the body of a cable is also possible by copying the appropriate link (to be found at theparagraph symbol). Please mark messages for social networking services like Twitter with the hash tags #cablegate and a hash containing the reference ID e.g. #10BELGRADE25.

Reference ID

Created

Released

Classification

Origin

10BELGRADE25

2010-02-05 14:02

2010-12-09 21:09

SECRET

Embassy Belgrade

VZCZCXRO7590

RR RUEHAG RUEHDBU RUEHFL RUEHKW RUEHLA RUEHNP RUEHROV RUEHSL

DE RUEHBW #0025/01 0361420 begin_of_the_skype_highlighting              
0025/01 0361420      end_of_the_skype_highlighting

ZNY SSSSS ZZH

R 051420Z FEB 10

FM AMEMBASSY BELGRADE

TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 0713

INFO EUROPEAN POLITICAL COLLECTIVE

RHEHAAA/NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL WASHINGTON DC

RHMFISS/HQ USEUCOM VAIHINGEN GE

RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHINGTON DC

RUZEJAA/JAC MOLESWORTH RAF MOLESWORTH UK

Friday, 05 February 2010, 14:20

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 05 BELGRADE 000025

SIPDIS

AMEMBASSY ANKARA PASS TO AMCONSUL ADANA

AMEMBASSY ASTANA PASS TO AMCONSUL ALMATY

AMEMBASSY BERLIN PASS TO AMCONSUL DUSSELDORF

AMEMBASSY BERLIN PASS TO AMCONSUL LEIPZIG

AMEMBASSY BELGRADE PASS TO AMEMBASSY PODGORICA

AMEMBASSY HELSINKI PASS TO AMCONSUL ST PETERSBURG

AMEMBASSY ATHENS PASS TO AMCONSUL THESSALONIKI

AMEMBASSY MOSCOW PASS TO AMCONSUL VLADIVOSTOK

AMEMBASSY MOSCOW PASS TO AMCONSUL YEKATERINBURG

EO 12958 DECL: 2020/02/05

TAGS PREL, PGOV, MARR, SR, KV

SUBJECT: SERBIA: AMBASSADOR’S FIRST MEETING WITH PRESIDENTIAL FOREIGN

POLICY ADVISOR RATKOVIC

REF: BELGRADE 19; STATE 9661

CLASSIFIED BY: Deborah Mennuti, Political Counselor, State, POL; REASON: 1.4(B), (D)

Summary

-------
1. (C) In a February 3 conversation with the Ambassador, presidential foreign policy advisor Jovan Ratkovic conveyed Serbia’s desire for intensified cooperation with the United States and detailed his plans to visit Washington February 10-12 to discuss possible ways forward on Kosovo, saying Serbia sought a “realistic, pragmatic, peaceful, win-win solution” for Serbs and Albanians. He expressed concern that the International Civilian Office (ICO) plan to integrate northern Kosovo could destabilize the situation and threaten political stability in Serbia, and would not engage on the issue of whether Serbia would seek an UNGA resolution calling for new status talks. Ratkovic noted the important role that KFOR played in Kosovo and said that Serbia would formally open its NATO mission by mid-2010 and increase its participation in Partnership for Peace activities. Progress toward EU membership would likely be slowed by EU enlargement fatigue and wariness of accepting new members until they were fully qualified, he predicted. Ratkovic expressed cautious optimism that a breakthrough in bilateral relations with Croatia would be possible, concern about Macedonia’s long-term stability, and disappointment with the poor state of relations with Montenegro. End Summary.

2. (SBU) The Ambassador paid an introductory courtesy call on presidential foreign policy advisor Jovan Ratkovic on February 3. Ratkovic was accompanied by his deputy Aleksandar Knezevic.

Bilateral Relations

-------------------

3. (SBU) The Ambassador thanked Ratkovic for his help in arranging for her to present her credentials to President Tadic so soon after arrival (Ref B), which had allowed her to get off to a quick start in meeting Serbian government officials. She told Ratkovic that she would work to build on the already-strong momentum of the bilateral relationship by expanding our cooperation on economic and security issues, while addressing difficult issues in a constructive way. The visits of Codel Voinovich, Codel Pomeroy, and EUR DAS Jones in February would be important opportunities for dialogue, she noted. Ratkovic said that Senator Voinovich was an old friend who was always welcome in Serbia. The fact that he and Senator Shaheen would be arriving on February 17 after having visited Pristina on the anniversary of Kosovo’s declaration of independence was problematic, however; Ratkovic was unable to confirm whether President Tadic would meet with the congressional delegation pending resolution of these itinerary concerns.

4. (S) Ratkovic expressed the hope that 2010 would be a “decisive” year for building bilateral relations in which the United States would treat Serbia as a true partner in all areas of cooperation, not just security. Serbia intended to continue its cooperation with the U.S. on sensitive intelligence matters and to increase defense cooperation by working on peacekeeping training with the Ohio National Guard. Multilaterally, Serbia had committed to sending up to 50 additional gendarmerie to UNMISTAH in Haiti under EU auspices and was in discussions with Spain about contributing troops to UNIFIL in Lebanon.

 

Brainstorming on Kosovo

-----------------------

5. (C) Ratkovic informed the Ambassador that he would visit Washington from February 10-12, after attending Wehrkunde in Munich and a Conservative Party event in London. He hoped to meet with A/S Gordon, as well as contacts in Congress, for “discreet brainstorming” on ways forward on Kosovo. The Ambassador conveyed U.S. concerns (Ref B) about indications that Serbia would continue to take a confrontational approach on Kosovo after the ICJ rendered its advisory opinion. Dismissing the question of whether Serbia would seek an UNGA resolution calling for new status talks as a “mere tactical issue” for the MFA to decide, Ratkovic said the Presidency was focused on the bigger question of how to achieve a “realistic, pragmatic, peaceful, win-win solution” for Serbs and Albanians. Ratkovic said that Serbia recognized and was trying to respect the “legitimate interests” of Kosovar Albanians; in return, Serbia expected the Kosovars to respect the legitimate interests of Serbia and Kosovo Serbs as well. He stressed that the Serbian government wanted the U.S. to be part of and support a solution that would lead to regional stability and reconciliation. For that reason, he hoped for high-level, free-thinking, and informal discussions in Washington; he had received explicit guidance from President Tadic on the specifics of his message, but was not at liberty to share it yet.

6. (C) Ratkovic returned to the topic of Kosovo later in the conversation, stressing the sensitivity of how the north is handled. Ratkovic argued that the northern part of Kosovo had a history distinct from the rest of the province, claiming that the three districts north of the Ibar were only annexed to the province after World War II to counter-balance the rapid growth of the ethnic Albanian population. “These people have never lived with Albanians, have never felt themselves part of Kosovo, and won’t accept rule by Pristina,” Ratkovic said. “Belgrade is not trying to change the reality on the ground for Kosovar Albanians, but changing the reality for Kosovo Serbs would also be destabilizing,” he added. For that reason the ICO proposal to integrate the north put forward by Peter Feith and supported by the United States was “not helpful,” according to Ratkovic, who claimed that military intervention was being discussed. He said that this was the primary reason that Tadic decided to address the UN Security Council on January 22: the implementation of such a strategy could result in instability and thus become a national security concern for Serbia, threatening the country’s democratization and pro-Western orientation. (Comment: Serbia’s historical arguments are routinely countered by Albanian historical recollections to the contrary. Ratkovic’s claims of a separate historical “reality” for Northern Mitrovica, therefore, would find resistance from Kosovo Albanian historians. End Comment.)

7. (C) The Ambassador responded that the ideas put forward by Feith were not new; the integration of northern Kosovo had always been on the table. She emphasized that there was no discussion of the use of force to impose the integration of the whole territory of Kosovo. Noting that we understand the Serbian government’s sensitivities, the Ambassador underscored the need to exchange views openly on the full range of unresolved issues and encouraged Ratkovic to share his thinking in detail while in Washington. Ratkovic said that Serbia had the EU’s assurances that the document produced by the ICO was not an EU plan. He added that given the situation on the ground and the attitude of Kosovo Serbs toward the ICO, the only way to implement the plan would be by use of force.

 

NATO Relations

--------------

8. (SBU) Asked about the President’s views on Serbia’s relations with NATO, Ratkovic said that as a former Minister of Defense, President Tadic knows the issue well. Tadic believes that Serbia cannot remain outside of NATO forever, but doesn’t say this often because of the political sensitivity of the issue. Ratkovic explained that after the fall of the Berlin Wall, the citizens of Yugoslavia assumed that they would be among the first to enter both the European Union and NATO. It wasn’t until the wars of the Milosevic era and the 1999 NATO intervention that anti-NATO sentiment developed in Serbia. Ratkovic characterized current public support for PfP participation and NATO membership as “surprisingly high” given Serbia’s history.

9. (C) Serbia is taking concrete steps to increase its engagement with NATO, Ratkovic said. It has appointed an ambassador to NATO and established a mission there; once the office is fully operational, President Tadic will travel to Brussels in June or July to open it formally and hopes to address the North Atlantic Council. Tadic had instructed the MFA and the MOD to increase Serbia’s participation in PfP “on the model of Austria.” These steps needed to precede any decision about membership, Ratkovic said. He added that President Tadic would meet with SACEUR/EUCOM CDR ADM James Stavridis in Belgrade on February 11. Ratkovic emphasized that NATO’s image in the Serbian public had a significant influence on the development of the relationship, mentioning the role of KFOR in protecting Kosovo Serbs and religious sites and concerns about its drawdown.

European Integration

---------------------

10. (C) Ratkovic predicted that the Spanish EU presidency would push for movement on Serbia’s EU membership application in March but did not know whether the effort would be successful, due to member-states’ enlargement fatigue and wariness of accepting any more new members that were not fully qualified. He charged that Germany’s misguided belief that enlargement was economically detrimental rather than beneficial had led it to introduce new hurdles for applicants, including making the forwarding of a membership application to the Commission for an avis a political rather than a technical question. He asserted that both Serbia and Croatia had the administrative capacity and political will to fulfill all EU criteria, noting that the upcoming tenth anniversary of the October 5, 2000, overthrow of Milosevic would provide an opportunity to remind the world of the results of Serbia’s “democratic revolution.”

Regional Relations

------------------

11. (C) The Ambassador told Ratkovic that the United States was supportive of Serbia’s efforts to improve its relations with Croatia and informed him that PRM DAS David Robinson would visit Belgrade in early March to look at how the United States could contribute to resolving protracted refugee issues, particularly

BELGRADE 00000025 004 OF 005

between Serbia and Croatia. Ratkovic said that the presidency was working discreetly with Croatia on a “roadmap” to resolve all of the outstanding bilateral issues, and that they understood the EU had sent a helpful message to Zagreb that Croatia needed to find solutions in order to close Chapter 23 of the acquis. He said he was cautiously optimistic that there would be a breakthrough with Croatia in 2010.

12. (C) Ratkovic expressed pessimism about prospects for constitutional reform in Bosnia-Herzegovina in light of upcoming elections. He said the Spanish EU presidency would make a last attempt to reach agreement before the election campaign began in earnest but would face difficult odds. Ratkovic reiterated that the Serbian government supported the territorial integrity of BiH and would not be swayed by what he claimed was the desire of the majority of Republika Srpska residents to secede and merge with Serbia. In this context, Serbia also supported BiH’s entry into EU and NATO as a way to stabilize the country and cement the current borders. Ratkovic said the USG had miscalculated in making constitutional reform a pre-condition for a NATO Membership Action Plan status for BiH, as most Bosnian Serbs were not for NATO. He expressed regret that the Butmir process had not produced agreement since many of the elements of the plan were acceptable to all three constituent peoples; it would have been better to avoid taking an “all or nothing” approach to the reforms and to have granted MAP status, he judged.

13. (C) Serbia is more worried about Macedonia’s future than Bosnia’s, Ratkovic said. It is not clear how a country composed of two completely different ethnic groups with no common language or religion can hold together, he commented, particularly with the ethnic Albanian population growing at such as rate that it will equal the Slavic population in 20 years. Ratkovic said that President Tadic was talking to both Greece and Macedonia about the name issue in hopes of unblocking Macedonia’s path to both the EU and NATO.

14. (C) Serbia’s relations with Montenegro were at a historic low, Ratkovic said, noting that as he and Tadic were both of Montenegrin origin they felt the situation keenly. He explained that the Montenegrin government had had to distance itself from Belgrade in order to win the independence referendum, but as there were no longer any divisive issues the ball was in Podgorica’s court. It remained to be seen if Montenegro would treat Serbia as “a strategic partner or a bogeyman,” Ratkovic commented. One important criterion will be how Montenegro addresses organized crime, which Ratkovic identified as a serious problem that Serbia believed must be tackled.

Comment

-------

15. (C ) As Tadic’s foreign policy advisor, Ratkovic’s comments come closest to reflecting the President’s views and vision on issues across the spectrum. His decision to visit Washington next week, under clear instruction, to outline Tadic’s thinking in a low-key manner on a post-ICJ way forward is a constructive step and may provide an important opportunity to influence Belgrade’s strategy. In a meeting with the UK ambassador (please protect) earlier this week, Ratkovic outlined the following ideas that likely reflect current thinking: Option A: some understanding of a bigger Serbian role in the north and over five monasteries in the south, in which case Belgrade would “accept” but not recognize Kosovo; Option B: Partition; Option C: Serbia chooses between Kosovo or the EU. Option A (i.e, finding a way to define Serbia’s special interests in the north and with the status of some churches in the south) most likely reflects the ideas that Belgrade is most interested in exploring. While Serbia’s lack of a commitment to recognize Kosovo will remain an EU stumbling in the long-term, Ratkovic’s overture next week may provide an initial first step toward defining a more realistic modus vivendi, which we have been encouraging the Serbs to explore.

16. (C) Ratkovic understands that the ideas he outlines next week will only provide a basis for discussion, with the expectation, of course, of much more work to follow. Nevertheless, we are encouraged by what appears to be a growing recognition of both the strategic and tactical importance of opening channels for a post-ICJ dialogue sooner rather than later, and the need to manage next steps in a way that does not undermine other key Belgrade objectives, above all eventual EU accession. FM Jeremic’s visit to Washington the week of February 22 and DAS Jones’s travel to the region the same week will provide important follow-on opportunities for continued engagement on the way ahead. End Comment. WARLICK

 

Anketa

Da li mislite da će u narednih godinu dana u Srbiji biti održani novi parlamentarni izbori?
 

Republika Srpska: Stanje i perspektive

Baner
Baner
Baner
Baner
Baner
Baner